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Abstract
In the present paper I develop a life-cycle portfolio choice model where
agents perceive stock returns to be ambiguous and are ambiguity averse.
As in Epstein and Schneider (2005) part of the ambiguity vanishes over
time as a consequence of learning over observed returns. The model shows
that ambiguity alone can rationalize moderate stock market participation
rates and conditional shares with reasonable participation costs but has
strongly counterfactual implications for conditional allocations to stocks
by age and wealth. When learning is allowed, conditional shares over the
life-cycle are instead aligned with the empirical evidence and patterns of
stock holdings over the wealth distribution get closer to the data.
Keywords: Portfolio choice, life-cycle, ambiguity, learning
JEL codes: G11, D91, H55
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1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a substantial surge of academic interest in the
problem of households’ financial decisions, perhaps triggered by the increased
importance of personal savings for retirement consumption that is taking place
in response to the debate about downsizing the role of unfunded social secu-
rity. A number of empirical facts have been documented regarding in particular
the stockholding behavior of households. These include the fact that partici-
pation rates, even though increasing over the years, are still at about half of
the population and the moderate share allocated to stocks by participants. It
has also been documented that the share of financial wealth allocated to stocks
is increasing in wealth and roughly constant or moderately increasing in age.1
Equally important has been the development of theoretical models that, based
on a workhorse of modern macroeconomics, that is, the precautionary savings
model, have tried to explore the same issue. The current paper joins this latter
line of research by exploring the role of a class of non standard preferences in
the context of the model cited above.
More specifically, in this paper I present a model of life-cycle portfolio choice
where agents perceive the return to one of the assets to be ambiguous and
are averse to ambiguity. As in Epstein and Schneider (2005) ambiguity can
be reduced over time through learning. The basic framework of the model
1Among the papers that have uncovered the patterns of household financial behavior are
Ameriks and Zeldes (2004), Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2000), Curcuru et al. (2004) and
Heaton and Lucas (2000) for the US. The book of Guiso et al. (2001) documented the same
facts for a number of other industrialized countries as well and the work by Calvet, Campbell
and Sodini (2007) has gone in much greater details to document stock-holding behavior among
Swedish households.
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is otherwise standard: agents have finite life and receive a stochastic earnings
stream during working life, followed by a constant pension benefit in retirement.
Agents cannot insure against earnings uncertainty, thus use savings as a self-
insurance instrument. Beside that they save for the other usual reasons, that is,
to finance consumption during retirement, to insure against uncertainty about
the length of life and to leave a bequest. Saving can occur through two assets, a
risk-free bond and a risky stock, and exogenous no borrowing and no short sale
constraints are imposed. Trading in the stock requires payment of a fixed per
period cost. Where the model departs from the basic framework is in the way
agents perceive the stock return process. In this regard the model assumes that
agents perceive the stock return process to be ambiguous, that is, they think
they cannot know the exact distribution governing that process but think it lies
in some set of distributions. Agents are averse to ambiguity according to the
max-min utility model developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) in a static
framework and extended to a dynamic setting by Epstein and Schneider (2003).
It is also assumed that the ambiguity present in the stock return process can be
reduced through the observation of the realized returns and that stock market
participants have an advantage at doing so.
The model is solved numerically and its properties are analyzed under a
broad set of parameters. It is shown that ambiguity aversion alone can generate
moderate participation rates and conditional shares without resorting to large
participation costs and it does so by assuming a fairly reasonable amount of am-
biguity in the stock return process. On the other hand the model with ambiguity
but no learning shows two very counterfactual properties when we look deeper
at its implications: stock shares for market participants are strongly declining
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in both age and wealth which is at odd with the empirical evidence. When
learning is introduced, the model, while retaining reasonable average partici-
pation rates and conditional shares, generates a life-cycle profile of conditional
stock allocation that is slightly increasing but with little variation as in the
data. It also displays constant stock shares over wealth levels, thus moving a
step in the right direction towards matching the empirically observed increasing
pattern. The intuition for these results is that under ambiguity — and with
short-selling constraints — the equity premium that is relevant for the decision
maker, henceforth called “worst case”equity premium, is the lowest given the
distributions in the posterior set. With learning the set of posteriors shrinks
over the life-cycle thus improving the “worst case”equity premium and inducing
investors to hold a larger share of stocks in their portfolios as they age. More-
over, given the assumption that stock market participants have an advantage at
learning, wealthier agents who have started to participate earlier will generally
face a smaller set of posteriors, hence a higher “worst case”equity premium.
This increases their demands of stocks, although quantitatively this does not go
as far as allowing to fully match the wealth-share profile observed in the data.
The main contribution of the paper is to document the implications of ambi-
guity aversion and learning in an ambiguous environment for household life-cycle
portfolio allocation and to show that these features may have an important role
in explaining the observed pattern of household financial choices. In doing so it
joins two very active lines of research. The first one is the literature on portfolio
allocation in precautionary savings models. This literature was first explored
by Heaton and Lucas (1997 and 2000) and Haliassos and Michaelides (2003)
in an infinite horizon setting and by Campbell et al. (2001), Cocco, Gomes
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and Maenhout (2005) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005) in a life-cycle setting.
These papers documented the basic properties of this type of model and pointed
out the difficulties it has to explain the low participation rates and conditional
stock shares observed in the data, in some cases proposing possible solutions.
More recently a number of papers and in particular the ones by Benzoni et al.
(2007), Lynch and Tan (2008) and Wachter and Yogo (2008) have looked for ex-
planations of patterns of household stock market investment over the life-cycle
and over wealth levels. In particular Benzoni et al. (2007) assume that labor
income and stock market returns are co-integrated and show that under this
assumption human capital is more like a stock for young agents lowering their
demand of equity. Lynch and Tan (2008) obtain a similar result by allowing
for correlation between stock returns and labor income growth and volatility.
Wachter and Yogo (2008) assume the existence of both basic and luxury goods
and show that under this assumption conditional portfolio shares of stocks are
increasing in wealth. Contrary to those papers the current one retains both
the assumption that labor earnings and stock returns are uncorrelated and that
the utility function is homothetic. The major departure from the more tra-
ditional framework lies in the fact that stock returns are ambiguous, agents
are averse to ambiguity and that ambiguity lessens over time through learn-
ing. The second line of research to which this paper is related is the one that
has studied the implications of model uncertainty in asset pricing and portfolio
choice. Contributions in a dynamic framework go back to Epstein and Wang
(1994). More recently Cao, Wang and Zhang (2005) explored the implications
of heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion for stock market participation and the
equilibrium equity premium in a static framework and Leippold, Trojani and
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Vanini (2005) studied a dynamic Lucas-style exchange economy with both ambi-
guity and learning. While the three papers cited above used the max-min model
of ambiguity aversion, Ju and Miao (2007) introduced the Klibanoff, Marinacci
and Mukerji (2006) smooth ambiguity model in a dynamic endowment economy
with learning about the hidden state and showed that the model can match a
wide set of asset pricing facts. Model uncertainty has also been studied in the
alternative framework of robust control of which two applications to asset pric-
ing are Maenhout (2004) in an endowment economy and Cagetti et al. (2002)
in a business cycle model. Examples of explorations of the role of ambiguity
aversion in portfolio choice models are Garlappi, Uppal and Wang (2006) that
use a static mean-variance approach and the same paper by Maenhout cited
above. This latter paper is dynamic as the present one, however it omits labor
income and uses the robust control approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I present the
description of the model, in Section 3 I report the choice of parameters, in
Section 4 I report the main findings of the analysis and finally in Section 5
some short conclusions are outlined. The paper is completed by two appendixes
where a short but formal treatment of the learning model and a description of
the numerical methods used to solve the model are provided.
2 The Model
2.1 Demography and Preferences
Time is discrete and the model period is assumed to be 1 year. Adult age is
denoted with the letter t and can range from 1 to T = 80 years. Agents are
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assumed to enter the model at age 20 so that real life age is equal to t + 20.
Each agent faces an age changing conditional probability of surviving to the
next period which will be denoted with pit. Surviving agents work the first 45
years and retire afterwards.
Agents do not value leisure, hence they derive utility from the stream of
consumption they enjoy during their life-time only. Utility over consumption
is defined by a period utility index u(ct) which will be assumed to be of the
standard iso-elastic form. Agents also derive utility from leaving a bequest;
the bequest motive is of the so called warm glow form hence can be simply
represented by a function D(.) defined over terminal wealth.
In the economy there are two independent sources of uncertainty. The first
one is determined by the stochastic process for labor earnings and it is standard
in that I assume that agents know its distribution. This process will be described
in a later subsection. The second one is the process for stock returns. Following
Epstein and Schneider (2005) it is assumed that this process is i.i.d. and that
agents perceive it as ambiguous. In other words they assume that stock returns
may be drawn from a whole family of distributions and even if they can learn
from past observations of realized returns, they can never shrink the set of
distributions to a singleton.
In every period an element ht ∈ H is observed: this pair consists of a
realization of the stock return wt ∈ W and a realization of the labor efficiency
unit shock zt ∈ Z. At age t then the agent’s information set consists of the
history ht = (h1, h2, ...., ht). Given that the horizon is finite the full state space
will be HT . The agent ranks consumption plans c = {ct} where consumption
ct depends on the history ht. At any age t = 1, 2, ......., T and given history ht,
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the agent’s ordering of consumption plans is represented by a conditional utility
function Ut defined recursively by:
Ut(c;ht) = min
p∈Pt(wt)
Ep[u(ct) + βEzt+1Ut+1(c;ht+1)] (1)
where β and u are defined above. The set of probability measures Pt(wt) models
beliefs about the next realization of the stock return process wt+1 given history
up to wt. When this set is a non-singleton such beliefs reflect ambiguity and
the minimization over p reflects ambiguity aversion.2 The set of probability
measures {P} is called process of conditional one-step ahead beliefs and together
with u(·) and β constitute the primitives of the functional form.
2.2 Labor Income and Pensions
I use the indexed letter Yt to denote income. During working life income is
determined by an uncertain stream of labor earnings. Earnings can be expressed
as the product of two components:
Yt = G(t)zt (2)
where the function G(t) is a deterministic function of age meant to capture the
hump in life-cycle earnings that is observed in the data. The second term, zt,
is a stochastic component that follows an AR(1) process in logarithms:
ln(zt) = ρln(zt−1) + εt (3)
where εt is an i.i.d. normal random variable.
In the retirement years agents receive a fixed pension benefit, so that
Yt = Yss. (4)
2The minimization is taken with respect to p only since the process for labor earnings is
independent and is not ambiguous.
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2.3 Financial Assets
Agents can use two different assets to carry out their investment plans. First
there is a one period risk free bond with price q and return Rf = 1q . The second
asset is a risky stock. Investors perceive the return to this asset ambiguous but
the actual return Rst+1 is generated by a single i.i.d. process that can take two
values: µ± δ with equal probability. Consequently µ− 1q is the average equity
premium and δ is the standard deviation of the equity return. The adoption
of this simple process for equity returns is needed to formulate the model of
learning about ambiguous stock returns used here and described in the next
section.
Trade in the two assets is subject to three frictions. First all households are
prevented both from borrowing and from selling short stock. Denoting bond
and stock-holdings with Bt and St respectively this implies:
Bt ≥ 0 (5)
St ≥ 0. (6)
Second, households who do participate in the stock market are subject to a
minimum investment limit that I denote with S, that is, the relevant constraint
for them is
St ≥ S. (7)
Third it is assumed that participation in the stock market requires payment of
a fixed cost Fp in each period.
A further important assumption about the stock market is that in the model
households that participate receive a signal about the ambiguous stock return
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process for sure while households who do not participate receive it only prob-
abilistically. The letter ξ will be used to denote the probability that a non
stockholder can infer information about the return process from the observed
realized return in any given year.
The minimum investment requirement and the differential flow of informa-
tion to stock holders and non stock holders are non standard, hence require some
comments. The fact that participants receive signals about the stock return
process with greater probability than non participants can be justified based
on ideas recently expressed in the “rational inattention”literature developed for
example by Sims (2006) and applied to monetary theory by Mankiw and Reis
(2006) and to consumer theory by Reis (2004). The founding principle behind
this theory is the observation that even though information may be in principle
free, still absorbing and processing it requires the allocation of resources to it
so that agents may choose to disregard it. As in Mankiw and Reis (2006) the
model presented here assumes exogenously a differential flow of information to
different agents rather than deriving the result from an optimal information
acquisition problem. 3 The advantage of stockholders though seems reasonable
if one takes into account that stockholders may receive already processed in-
formation through their broker or other financial advisor or as a side product
of activities required by stock-holding like compiling the relevant section of tax
forms. More generally it is arguable that if an agent has only limited processing
resources to allocate to her financial decisions she will follow more closely those
assets she has in her portfolio. With respect to the minimum equity requirement
3Mankiw and Reis (2006) estimate the probabilities of information update. The complexity
of the current model makes this impossible so that a baseline case plus sensitivity analysis
will be carried out.
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observe that as long as participating in the stock market gives an informational
advantage towards resolving ambiguity, as assumed here, it can be optimal to
pay the fixed cost even if the current “worst case”equity premium is negative.
This could potentially make some agents pay the fixed participation cost but
hold no stocks which would be contradictory. At an empirical level this choice
can be justified for example by observing that mutual fund companies and bro-
kerage houses often impose minimum investment limits. Also some work like
Heaton and Lucas (2000) study stock portfolio allocation at the empirical level
conditional on stock holding being above a threshold of 500 dollars to rule out
occasional investors.
2.4 Learning
In the current section an informal description of the learning process is given
while the mathematical details are left for an appendix. As it was said the stock
return can be described by a two point i.i.d. process. Let us denote with wt
the stock return state, where wt = 1 refers to the high stock return state and
wt = 0 denotes the low stock return state. It is assumed that the probability of
a high and a low stock return are equal, that is, pr(wt = 1) = pr(wt = 0) = 0.5.
Ambiguity arises because agents do not think they know the probability of a
high stock return pr(wt = 1), but they think it can lie in some set. Starting
from some set of priors on this probability, learning allows the size of this set
to change over time in response to the information carried by the stock return
realization. As it was said in the previous section the model assumes that
stock market participants update the set of posteriors in each period, while non
participants do so only with some probability.
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The learning environment is described by two parameters.4 A first parameter
denoted with θ describes features of the environment that the agent can learn
about and it is assumed that θ ∈ Θ = [λ¯, 1 − λ¯] where 0 < λ¯ < 12 . There are
also features of the data generating process that the agent does not think can
be learnt and this is reflected by a multiplicity of likelihoods. In practice the
likelihood that a high stock return is observed given θ is `(wt = 1|θ) = θ + λ
where λ ∈ [−λ¯, λ¯]. At the beginning of life agents believe that θ ∈ M0 ⊂ Θ
where M0 is the set of initial priors. Agents observe the sequence of stock
returns. If the agent had the chance to see an infinite sequence of stock return
realizations the set of posteriors M(wt) would converge to the singleton θ = 12 ,
that is, the true probability of a high stock return. Even in this case though
ambiguity would not entirely vanish because of the multiplicity of likelihoods.
With a finite horizon the set of posteriors tend to shrink but cannot converge
to a singleton leaving a larger extent of ambiguity. A parameter that will be
denoted α in what follows, regulates how fast the set of posteriors responds to
new information.
As an illustration I report below in figure 1 the boundaries of the set of
posteriors as a function of an agent’s age under some special conditions that
help highlighting the effects of learning. In particular it is assumed that the
agent has updated the set of posteriors in every period and that the fraction of
high stock returns is a half in any period. 5 The parameters of the learning
model, that is, λ¯, α and the initial set of priorsM0 are chosen as in the baseline
4This framework of learning under multiple priors was set in Epstein and Schneider (2005).
The reader is referred to that paper for a detailed description of the environment and the theo-
retical results. An appendix in this paper gives a short formal description of that environment.
5This is possible only for even periods, values for odd periods are interpolated.
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Figure 1: Posterior bounds as a function of the number of signals.
model in section 4.1.2. As it can be seen the set of posteriors shrinks over time
and it does so at a decreasing pace: at the beginning of life the agent thinks that
the probability of a high stock return can be anywhere between approximately
0.3 and 0.7, while after 80 signals she thinks this probability can be only between
0.4 and 0.6. Figure 2 reports the bounds of the range of expected equity returns
corresponding to the bounds of the posteriors represented in figure 1. As it
can be seen, the range of equity premia shrinks in response to the reduction
in the posterior set. At the beginning of life the expected equity returns can
be, in the agent’s belief as low as 1.5 percent and as high as 13 percent; after
the observation of 80 signals they can only range from about 4 percent to 10
percent. Notice that the upper dotted line represents the expected equity return
corresponding to the largest probability of a high stock return in the posterior
set and is also the max-min return for an ambiguity averse agent that has a
short position in stocks. The lower dashed curve represents the expected equity
return corresponding to the smallest probability of a high stock return in the
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Figure 2: Bounds of expected equity returns as a function of the number of
signals.
posterior set and is also the max-min return for an ambiguity averse agent that
has a long position in stocks. Given that in the model short-selling is ruled
out this latter curve represents the “worst case”equity premium in the baseline
model; for comparison the straight continuous line reports the bond return, thus
the difference between the two curves gives a glimpse at the evolution of the
“worst case”equity premium over the life-cycle. For the purpose of illustration
the curves in figures 1 and 2 are drawn for the very special case that at each time
half of the past realizations of stock returns are high and half low, so in some
sense they are also the average of a large number of simulated random draws.
For more general random draws the posterior bounds and corresponding equity
returns would show a sawtooth path with the tendency of the set of posteriors
to shrink but with the possibility that it expands in response to a sequence of
low stock returns.
Finally Epstein and Schneider (2005) proved that the set of posteriors can
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be characterized as a function of two state variables only, that is, the fraction
of prior stock return realizations that were high that we denote with φt and
the number of prior observations on the stock return realization that we denote
with nt. This feature of the learning model used here is very convenient because
it only adds two state variables to the dynamic programming problem, thus
keeping it tractable even if somewhat burdensome.
2.5 The Optimization Problem
With the description of the model given above it is now possible to state the
household’s optimization problem in dynamic programming form. In order to
make the description more readable I divide the section into two paragraphs, the
first one describing the indirect utility of an agent if she chooses to participate in
the stock market and the second one for an agent that chooses not to participate.
Participation Indirect Utility The indirect utility of an agent if she decides
to participate in the stock market is given by the following equation:
V partt (Xt, zt, φt, nt) = max
ct,Bt+1,St+1
min
pt∈Pt
{
u(ct)+
+ βE
[
pit+1Vt+1(Xt+1, zt+1, φt+1, nt+1) + (1− pit+1)D(Xt+1)
]}
(8)
subject to the budget constraint
ct + qBt+1 + St+1 ≤ Xt + Yt − Fp (9)
the transition equation for financial resources
Xt+1 = Bt+1 +R(wt+1)St+1 (10)
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the transition equation for the fraction of time a high return was observed
φt+1(wt+1) =
ntφt + wt+1
nt + 1
(11)
, the equation describing the number of past signals about the stock return
process observed
nt+1 = nt + 1 (12)
the inequality constraints (5) and (7) and equations (2), (3) and (4) that define
the nonfinancial income available to the agent from labor earnings or pensions.
The agent’s state variables are the amount of financial resources Xt, the labor
earnings shock zt, the fraction of past observations on the stock return that were
high φt and the number of those signals observed nt. The agent chooses the
amounts of stocks, bonds and consumption that maximize his utility but since
he has max-min preferences he minimizes these optimal values with respect to
Pt, the set of admissible beliefs. Given the way the learning process is modeled
the set Pt is defined by {(θ, λ)|θ ∈ Mαt , λ ∈ [−λ¯, λ¯]}. The argument of the
function to be maximized that we find in curly braces is the sum of the utility
of current consumption plus continuation utility which in turn is given with
probability pit+1 — the probability of survival — by the continuation value
function and with probability 1 − pit+1 by the utility from bequests function
D(Xt+1). The expectation operator is taken with respect to the distributions
pt and the distribution of next period labor shock conditional on the current
value zt. Inequality (9) is a standard budget constraint: it states that the
expenditures in consumption, bond and stock purchases must not exceed the
sum of financial resources, plus the income from earnings or pensions minus
the fixed participation cost. Equation (10) describes the evolution of financial
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resources as the sum of one-period bonds plus stock times its gross return. This
return can take a high value or low value depending on whether the state wt
takes a value of 1 or 0. Equation (12) shows that for an agent who decides to
participate in the stock market the number of past signals on the stock return
process increases by one between the current and the next period and finally
equation (11) describes how, depending on whether the realized return is high
or low, — wt+1 equal to 1 or 0 — the past fraction of high signals observed is
updated.
Non Participation Indirect Utility The indirect utility of an agent who
decides not to participate in the stock market is given by the following equation:
V nopartt (Xt, zt, φt, nt) = max
ct,Bt+1
min
pt∈Pt
{
u(ct)+
βE
[
pit+1EVt+1(Xt+1, zt+1, φt+1, nt+1) + (1− pit+1)D(Xt+1)
]}
(13)
subject to the budget constraint
ct + qBt+1 ≤ Xt + Yt, (14)
the law of motion of financial resources
Xt+1 = Bt+1, (15)
the law of motion of the fraction of past high signals on the stock return process
φt+1 =
 φt with probability 1− ξntφt+wt+1
nt+1
with probability ξ
and the law of motion of the past number of signals observed
nt+1 =
 nt with probability 1− ξnt + 1 with probability ξ.
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As it can be seen the problem has the same state variables as the one of an agent
who chooses to participate and the maximization on the right hand side of equa-
tion (13) differs from the analogous equation (8) only in that the maximization
is performed on consumption and bonds with the amount of stocks being zero by
definition. Also notice that the minimization with respect to the distributions
in the set Pt must take place even if the agent does not buy stocks. This is
because the investor is still exposed to ambiguity through the probability that a
signal about the stock market return process is observed. The budget constraint
(14) simply states that for a non participant expenditures on consumption and
bonds must not exceed income from labor or pensions plus financial resources
and the law of motion (15) expresses that fact that for a non stockholder fi-
nancial resources next period coincide with the amount of one period risk-free
bonds purchased in the current period. The last two laws of motion reflect the
probabilistic receipt of a signal about the stock return generating process by
an agent who does not participate in the stock market. With probability ξ the
agent receives the signal, hence the number of past observations received grows
by one and the fraction of those that were high is updated based on the value of
the shock wt. With probability 1 − ξ the investor does not observe a signal so
that both the number of observations and the fraction of those that were high
stay constant at their current value φt and nt.
Finally the household’s optimal value function will result by taking the max-
imum of the indirect utility from participating and from not participating in the
stock market:
Vt(Xt, zt, φt, nt) = max
{
V nopartt (Xt, zt, φt, nt), V
part
t (Xt, zt, φt, nt)
}
. (16)
The problem has no analytical solution so that numerical methods are used
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to examine its properties. The solution procedure consists of two parts: first
decision rules are computed from the agent’s dynamic programming problem;
second these decision rules are used, together with random draws of the stochas-
tic variables, to compute life-cycle profiles for 1000 agents. The simulation is
repeated 30 times and the reported results are obtained by averaging over those
repetitions. More details about the solution method are given in Appendix B.
3 Parameter Calibration
3.1 Preferences Parameters
Preferences are defined by the functional form and parameters of the period
utility index and the function defining the utility of bequests plus the subjective
discount factor. The utility index is chosen to be of the standard iso-elastic form:
u(ct) =
c1−σt
1−σ and a baseline value of 2.5 is chosen for σ, the coefficient of relative
risk aversion. A sensitivity analysis on this parameter will be performed, using
values of 1.5 and 3.5 as well. These values are somewhat lower than those
typically used in the life-cycle portfolio choice literature but more in line with
the preferred values of macroeconomic studies. The utility of bequest function
is defined as D(Xt+1) = d
(Xt+1/d)
1−σ
1−σ , that is, I use the same functional form
and curvature of the utility index. The additional parameter d which sets the
strength of the bequest function is taken to be 2.5, one of the values used by
Gomes and Michaelides (2005) who also use the same functional form. The
subjective discount factor β is set equal to 0.95 a value commonly used in the
macro and finance literature. The effective discount rate is determined also by
the conditional survival probabilities which are taken from the male survival
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probabilities available at the “Berkeley Mortality Database ”.6
3.2 Learning Parameters
The process for learning is characterized by three quantities: the long run am-
biguity, the initial ambiguity and the speed at which the agents are willing to
get rid of ambiguity over the life-cycle by incorporating the new information
contained in the sequence of realized stock returns. For this reason we need to
specify three parameters to fully describe the features of learning in this ambigu-
ous environment. The long run ambiguity, that is the component of ambiguity
that the agent thinks he cannot get rid of even in the long run — i.e. asymptot-
ically — is entirely fixed by the parameter λ¯ whose value I fix at 0.01. Following
Epstein and Schneider (2005) this value implies that in the long run the set of
posteriors of the probability of high stock returns shrinks to [0.49, 0.51] which
implies a range of equity premia of 64 basis points. This number seems suffi-
ciently small to leave substantial scope for learning in the model. The speed at
which the agent is willing to get rid of ambiguity is governed by the parameter
α and its value is taken to be 0.2 in the baseline case. Finally, once the speed of
learning is fixed, I determine the initial extent of ambiguity perceived in the data
by assuming that prior to entering the model agents observed a certain number
of stock return realizations that follow exactly the data generating process, that
is, are 50 percent high and 50 percent low. The number of such observations
is fixed at 20 in the baseline case. It should be stressed that this statement
is only technical in nature, that is, it only serves the purpose of fixing initial
ambiguity and should not be taken literally as to imply that the agent observed
6The database is available at the website http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/ bmd/.
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stock market realizations prior to entering the model.7 Under the parameters
chosen the initial set of posteriors of the probability of high stock returns is
the interval [0.30336, 0.69662]; with such an interval the difference between the
maximum and minimum expected equity premium implied by the agent’s set
of beliefs is 12.58 percentage points wide. Since there is no direct evidence on
which one can base the choice of these two parameters a sensitivity analysis will
be performed on both the speed of updating and the initial ambiguity. Also
empirical evidence to support the claim that the extent of ambiguity over the
life-cycle implied by this choice of parameters is reasonable will be discussed in
the result section.
3.3 Labor Income and Pensions
The specification of the labor earnings process during working life requires fixing
two sets of parameters. The first one refers to the function G(t) which defines
the deterministic hump-shaped component of earnings. This function is assumed
to be a third degree polynomial in age and the coefficients are taken form the
estimates by Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) for high school graduates.
These estimates when aggregated over five year groups are also consistent with
the ones of Hansen (1993) based on the whole population. The second one is the
idiosyncratic component zt which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with
autocorrelation coefficient ρ = 0.95 and a standard deviation of the innovation
σε = 0.158, both values taken from Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994).
During retirement it is assumed that agents receive a fixed pension benefit
7In principle one could think that the agent got some information about the stock market
process from family members, neighbors or other sources during childhood or teen-age but I
don’t want to stick to that interpretation.
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equal to 68 percent of average lifetime earnings conditional on the last year
of earnings. The replacement ratio implicit in this formula is chosen based on
Gomes and Michaelides (2005).
3.4 Asset Returns and Fixed costs
The bond price is set at 0.98 which implies a risk free return of about 2 percent
annually. The stock return process is modeled as a two point i.i.d. process
with the expected value µ set at 7.5 percent percent annually and a standard
deviation δ of 16 percent. The value of the risk free rate is close to but a little
lower than what reported in Cecchetti et al. (2000) and a little higher than what
other authors in the asset pricing literature have used.8 The equity premium of
5.5 percent is a little below the values used in that literature that range from
5.75 in Cecchetti et al. (2000) to about 8 percent in Lettau (2003). As in other
work on life-cycle portfolio allocation the use of a reduced equity premium may
be thought to proxy for the existence of proportional transaction costs that
the agent normally has to pay even after paying the fixed participation cost
and that, if modeled explicitly, would add a non trivial extra burden on the
numerical solution of a problem that is already quite demanding.9
Empirical work that tried to measure the magnitude of fixed stock market
participation costs found values in the range of 50 to 200 dollars.10 The cost
in the model is then set so that when compared to model wages it is consistent
with values at the lower end of that interval.
The minimum equity investment is set at about 4 percent of average annual
8See for example Mehra and Prescott (1985) or Lettau (2003).
9The choice to use a reduced equity premium can be found for example in Campbell et al.
(2001), Cocco, Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005).
10See Paiella (2001) and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002).
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earnings in the economy. Assuming a plausible 35000 dollar average earnings
this would be equivalent to 1400 dollars, a value in line with the minimum in-
vestment requirement at several large mutual fund companies. 11 As a robust-
ness check the model was also solved assuming a smaller and larger minimum
requirement of approximately 2.25 and 5.75 percent average annual earnings.
Since the results are very similar to the baseline case they won’t be reported.
Finally, to complete the description of the parameters concerning the assets
in the economy we need to specify the probability with which agents that do not
participate in the stock market get a signal about the process generating equity
returns. Unfortunately here there is no empirical base for calibration hence I
present results for a baseline value of 0.2 and present sensitivity analysis using
values of 0.3 and 0.1 as well.
4 Results
In this section I report the results of the simulation of the model. The main
focus throughout the section will be on average conditional allocations to stock
and their patterns over the life-cycle and by wealth levels. As a check on the
model also average participation rates and their pattern over the life-cycle will
be reported. To economize on space though I will omit participation rates by
wealth since those conform closely with what other models have found and with
the data. The section is divided into three subsections. In the first one I report
a benchmark case and, for comparisons, results of models that abstract from
11I performed a casual search of some large mutual fund companies’ web-sites and found
that they impose such requirements and that they range from 250 $ at American Funds to 3000
$ at Vanguard. The latter also provides brokerage services and imposes the same minimum
investment on those.
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learning and from both learning and ambiguity but that are otherwise similar
to the complete model in the choice of parameters. In this section the intuition
behind the results will also be described. In the second subsection I report the
results of a sensitivity analysis on several parameters to check the robustness of
the findings of the model. In the third subsection I report results that are ob-
tained with sample draws of the stock return sequence to highlight the potential
of the model to generate cohort effects. I also describe the implications of the
different models presented here for the wealth distribution and examine briefly
the results of models that make alternative assumptions about the difference of
participants and non participants in absorbing the information contained in the
return realizations into their posteriors.
4.1 A Benchmark Case
4.1.1 The Model without Learning
In this section I report the results that are obtained when learning is omitted
from the model so that the extent of ambiguity that agents perceive in the
stock return process is constant over time. Otherwise the model uses the same
parameters as the baseline case with learning. The only other difference is
that the per-period participation cost is set so as to obtain the same average
participation rate as in the baseline case with learning. For exposition purposes
I also report the results of a model that, keeping the same set of parameters,
abstracts from ambiguity altogether and recalibrates the participation cost to
get the same participation rate as the previous model.
The model with neither ambiguity nor learning can generate an average
participation rate of 43.6 percent with a participation cost equal to about 11
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percent of average annual earnings. Taking a rough estimate of the latter to
be 35000 dollars implies a fixed cost of 3850 dollars per year. This cost is
clearly huge and beside that the model generates an allocation to stocks for
market participants of 99.7 percent. This result is not new and the intuition
was well explained for example in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005): with
stock returns uncorrelated with labor earnings the latter are a form of implicit
holdings of a risk-free asset. Given this and the high equity premium households
will want to invest almost entirely in risky stocks, hence the very high conditional
stock share. On the other hand because of the large benefit of investing in the
stock market, a large cost will be needed to deter agents from participating in
it.
When ambiguity is added it is possible to obtain virtually the same partic-
ipation rate — 43.7 percent — with a much smaller per period participation
cost, that is, 0.7 percent of annual earnings. Again taking a reference value for
average annual earnings of 35000 dollars this cost is equivalent to about 245 dol-
lars. This number is reasonably small, although slightly larger than estimates
provided by Paiella (2001) and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) and ranging between
50 and 200 dollars. At the same time the model generates an allocation to
stocks conditional on participation of about 58.2 percent a number close to the
figures reported for example by Guiso et al. (2001). This result is obtained
by assuming a “worst case”expected equity premium for a stock buyer of 0.9
percent. Since the relevant equity premium used by the agent in his optimal
allocation problem is much lower this justifies the substantially smaller portfolio
share of stocks. At the same time both the lower “worst case”equity premium,
hence smaller perceived benefit of stock holding and the lower optimal share will
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enable a reasonably small per period participation cost to generate moderate
participation rates as in the data.
Even though the model with ambiguity seems to provide a straightforward
explanation for the moderate stock market participation rate and conditional
stock shares one should check that this is obtained with a reasonable amount of
ambiguity and that the model is consistent with other features of investors’ be-
havior. With respect to the first issue one useful comparison can be drawn with
the amount of uncertainty about the expected equity premium from a survey
of finance professors reported in Welch (2000). This seems particularly appro-
priate in light of the experimental findings of Fox and Tversky (1995) that it is
precisely when an agent knows that there are experts that are more knowledge-
able than her on a subject that ambiguity aversion arises more strongly. The
author interviewed 226 academic professors in finance asking among else to re-
port a measure of the central tendency and 95 percent confidence interval of the
arithmetic 30-year average of their equity premium forecast. He found the aver-
age central tendency was about 7 percent with the average confidence interval
ranging from 2.2 to about 13 percent. If one interprets the 95 percent confidence
interval as a plausible representation of the multiplicity of stock return distribu-
tions entertained by those academic professors the “worst case”equity premium
would be 2.2 percent versus the 0.9 percent used in the current experiment. Also
more than a tenth of the respondents considered as a “pessimistic scenario”an
equity premium of 0 percent or less. Hence the number used here seems quite
reasonable or even conservative, especially if one considers that it is reasonable
to assume that a lay person faces more uncertainty about the expected equity
premium than an academic professor in finance. A second argument can be
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developed along the lines of Jorion and Goetzmann (1999). The two authors
claim that when we use the experience of the last century in the US to assess
the equity premium we are actually conditioning on the experience of the most
successful equity market in recent history. They compute return for other mar-
kets in the period 1921 to 1996 and find a median average return that is 3.5
percentage points below the one in the US with some countries without any
mayor disruption in the functioning of the market — like Italy or New Zealand
— at 4.5 percentage points below the US one. Something similar can be said for
the US in previous times since according to Siegel (1992) the equity premium
in the period 1802 to 1870 was only 1.5 percent, 6 and a half percentage points
below the one in the period 1926 to 1990. To the extent that investors are
aware of this, assuming that they think that the “worst case”equity premium
is 4.5 percent less than the true one, as it is done here, seems reasonable. Fi-
nally, a third argument is based on the well known fact that the average of a
volatile series cannot be pinpointed with high precision unless a very long draw
of data is available. For example Cochrane (1997) reports that with a 50 year
long sequence of US data running from 1947 to 1996 the 95 percent confidence
interval for the average equity premium is ± 5 percent away from its 8 percent
mean. Once again if we think about the 95 percent confidence interval as the
set of plausible distributions, a “worst case”equity premium 4.5 percent below
the true one as assumed here seems quite reasonable.
On the other test though the model fares quite worse. This can be seen with
the help of Figure 3 where I report the life-cycle profiles of conditional allocations
to stocks for both models considered in this section. The continuous line at the
top represents the profile for the model without ambiguity and consistently with
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Figure 3: Life-Cycle profile of conditional stock shares, models without learn-
ing/ambiguity.
an overall average conditional share of 100 percent it is almost equal to that
value at all ages. The dashed line represents instead the profile for the model
with ambiguity. As it can be seen the conditional average allocation to stocks
starts at 100 percent in the first decade of life and then monotonically declines
to only 20 percent in the last decade of life. This profile is strongly at odd
with the data where conditional shares tend to increase slightly early in the
very first decade of life and then are virtually constant afterwards. Similar
declining patterns have been found in other studies like Cocco, Gomes and
Maenhout (2005) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005), especially during working
life. Compared to those papers the decline in the model with ambiguity is
quantitatively even stronger and persists all over the life-cycle. The intuition
is that early in life the agent holds a large amount of relatively safe human
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Figure 4: Life-Cycle profile of participation rates, models without learn-
ing/ambiguity.
capital and little financial wealth hence would like to invest the latter entirely
in stocks to benefit from the equity premium. As it ages human capital gets
progressively smaller and financial wealth accumulates inducing the agent to
diversify towards safe bonds. After retirement the further path depends on
whether wealth is drawn down more rapidly than the progressive reduction in
the residual non financial wealth as the horizon shortens. While this intuition
is common with the one in the models cited above, here the reduced perceived
benefit of stock market participation associated with the “worst case”equity
premium makes the decline in stock shares more substantial.
In Figure 4 I report the life-cycle profiles of participation rates for the models
analyzed in this section. As it can be seen both the model without and the
model with ambiguity generate hump-shaped life-cycle profiles of participation
rates. The hump is quite pronounced in both models. In the model without
ambiguity this is simply the consequence of the fact that in order to match the
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average participation rate an implausibly large per-period participation cost is
needed, hence participation rates tend to be very low at both ends of the life-
cycle when the wealth stock has not yet formed or has been depleted. In the
model with ambiguity the per-period participation cost is lower but the benefit of
participation per unit invested is also lower because the relevant equity premium,
corresponding to the “worst case”distribution of stock returns is small. As a
consequence once again households will find it convenient to participate in the
stock market only when the amount of wealth that can be invested in it is
substantial, something that occurs only in the central part of the life-cycle.
Summarizing the assumption that the agent considers the stock return am-
biguous and is averse to ambiguity helps generating moderate participation rates
in the stock market and moderate portfolio allocations to stocks for participants
but it does so at the cost of taking a step in the wrong direction as far as the
life-cycle profile of conditional shares is concerned. Motivated by this finding in
the next section I introduce learning in the model.
4.1.2 The Baseline Model with Learning
In this section I present the results of the model with learning in a multiple prior
environment a` la Epstein and Schneider (2005) described in the model section
of this paper. The choice of parameters is the one described as the baseline
case in the calibration section. Under that calibration the model produces
an average participation rate of 43.1 percent and an average share invested in
stocks for participants of 59.6 percent. Both figures are roughly consistent with
the empirical evidence: the participation rate is a little below the most recent
figures which are around 50 percent starting from the 1998 Survey of Consumer
31
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Age
Co
nd
itio
na
l s
to
ck
 s
ha
re
s
Figure 5: Life-cycle profile of conditional stock shares, baseline case.
Finances and somewhat above the ones for the preceding years — they were
at 40.4 percent in 1995.12 The conditional share was 59.4 percent in the 1998
SCF according to Guiso et al. (2001) and only slightly below that figure in
the 1995 and 2001 SCF according to Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Gomes and
Michaelides (2005) respectively. The life-cycle profile of conditional stock shares
is reported in Figure 5. As it can be seen, when learning is allowed the strongly
declining profile is overturned and substituted with an increasing profile that
except for the first decade of life shows indeed a quite limited variation over the
life-cycle. This brings the model predictions close to their empirical counterpart
since in the data conditional stock shares tend to show little variation over age,
with a small increase early in life. This is confirmed by Table 1 where I report the
12The sources for these figures are the studies by Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2000) and
Guiso el al. (2001).
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Table 1: Conditional shares by age
20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70+
Data 52.0 53.7 61.8 62.1 61.4 59.4
Ambiguity 98.9 88.2 70.4 48.9 34.8 30.5
Learning 32.6 48.7 54.1 59.7 59.3 63.2
data underlying Figure 5 together with data from the US presented in Guiso et
al. (2001). In the model all wealth is financial, hence the reported shares are the
shares of the risky asset in total financial wealth which coincides with total non-
human wealth. For comparability the data from Guiso et al. (2001) refer to the
same qualitative variable, that is, they represent the share of stocks — directly
and indirectly held — in total financial wealth which excludes housing and
business assets. As we can see by comparing the first and last row of the table
the life-cycle profile generated by the model tracks the empirical one quite closely
from the second decade to the end of life and only underestimates it somewhat in
the first decade of life. For comparison the second row reports also the profile for
the model with ambiguity but not learning presented in the previous subsection.
This profile is by contrast strongly monotonically decreasing and quite far from
the empirical one also in quantitative terms.
In order to develop the intuition to explain this result we can look at Figures
6 and 7. The first of the two figures represents the “worst case”expected equity
return for a buyer as a function of the number of observations of the realized
stock return assuming that these were 50 percent of the time high and 50 per-
cent of the time low. In the same graph also reported by the flat continuous line
is the return on the risk-free bond. As it can be seen the “worst case”equity
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Figure 6: Worst case expected equity premium.
premium moves from -1 percent for an agent with no prior observations of the
realized returns to a little more than 2 percent for an agent that received the
signal for almost all his life. This follows from the fact that as more and more
signals reflecting the underlying process generating the stock returns are re-
ceived, the set of possible distributions shrinks, hence the “worst case”expected
equity premium increases. This is reflected in the decision rules presented in
Figure 7. As an example the figure reports decision rules at ages 30, 40, 50,
60 and 70 for an agent that participated in the stock market in every period
and observed prior to each of those dates 50 percent of the times a high return
realization and 50 percent of the times a low return realization. As one may
see those decision rules are higher and higher as the agent gets older, hence had
the time to observe more signals. Notice that the work of Cocco, Gomes and
Maeanhout (2005) pointed out that in a conventional
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Figure 7: Stock portfolio decision rules.
framework stock decision rules should move inwards as the agent ages to
reflect the progressive reduction in relatively safe human wealth. While this
phenomenon still exists in the current model, the shrinking of the posterior sets
determines a counteracting force that overturns the age-decision rules relation-
ship. Summarizing, along the life-cycle two forces would push the household
towards a smaller exposition to stock market risk: one is the above mentioned
reduction in the holdings of safe human wealth and the second is the progressive
accumulation of wealth to finance retirement consumption — corresponding in
the graph to a movement outwards along a given decision rule. On the other
hand learning adds a force in the opposite direction given by the reduction in
the posterior set and the ensuing improvement in the “worst case”equity pre-
mium. Overall as Figure 5 shows this turns the life-cycle profile of conditional
stock shares into one that exhibits a mildly increasing pattern.
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Figure 8: Life-cycle profile of participation rates, baseline case.
The life-cycle profile of participation rates is reported in Figure 8. As it can
be seen that profile is increasing in the first part of life and up to retirement age;
after that it is modestly declining. The initial steep increase is justified by the
need of accumulating wealth to pay the per-period fixed cost and the fact that
early in life the set of posteriors for the stock return distribution is still rather
large leaving room for a substantial increase of the “worst case”equity premium.
During retirement, while wealth is depleted possibly driving households out of
the stock market, the set of beliefs tends to further shrink improving the “worst
case”equity premium and making households more willing to pay the cost even
in the face of smaller sizes of the investment. The mild decrease in participation
rates is then the balance of these two opposing forces. As it can be seen in Table
2 the model is qualitatively consistent with the data. Quantitatively the fit is
good as far as the increasing part of the profile during working life is concerned.
13 Afterwards though, while participation rates are strongly declining in the
13In judging this statement observe that the average participation rate in the model is about
43 percent, that is, an average of participation rates in the last few editions of the SCF, while
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Table 2: Participation rates by age
20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70+
Data 34.3 51.8 58.3 61.4 47.1 32.4
Ambiguity 9.25 38.9 58.3 64.6 58.9 32.5
Learning 13.8 38.9 47.9 54.1 56.6 53.2
data, they are only mildly so in the model. Despite the apparent inconsistency
one should be warned that for participation rates there is a debate over whether
life-cycle profiles are actually hump-shaped or increasing. For example Ameriks
and Zeldes (2004) suggest that older households belong to cohorts that were less
likely to participate in the stock market at all ages compared to younger cohorts,
so that the decline in participation rates that we observe in cross-sectional data
may not indeed reflect a tendency for older households to shift out of the stock
market.
Finally we want once more to comment on the extent of ambiguity implied
by the parameters chosen in this calibration of the model. We can see from fig-
ure 6 that starting from about 20 observations the “worst case”equity premium
is about 1 percent and increases to a bit more than 2 percent after 70 obser-
vations. In light of the discussion in the previous section these numbers seem
reasonable. In particular, they amount to say that after about 20 signals the
agent’s uncertainty about the equity premium is only 1 percentage point larger
than the average for academic professors in finance reported by Welch (2000)
and that after a life of observations it becomes indeed smaller than that. As far
as agents with fewer than 10 years of observations on the stock return process
in the 1998 issue of the survey it had climbed up to 49 percent.
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are concerned the current parametrization entails a “worst case”equity premium
that is negative. This can be justified in light of the results of field studies re-
ported in Lusardi and Mitchell (2007). The two authors describe findings of
several surveys about financial literacy in the general population. Perhaps sur-
prisingly to the academician, when asked about the historical performance of
stocks versus fixed income investments a third or more of the respondents did
not know that the former yielded a higher return than the latter. If we interpret
this finding in terms of multiple priors this suggests that those households deem
possible stock return distributions that entail a negative equity premium. 14
Also as it was pointed out in section 4.1.1 even in the sample of finance profes-
sors surveyed in Welch (2000), about ten percent admitted a negative “worst
case”equity premium over a thirty-year horizon.
4.1.3 Conditional Shares by Wealth
In this section I examine the results of the model with and without learning along
another dimension, that is, the allocation to stocks for participants along the
wealth distribution. This is done in Table 3. The table reports in the first row
the empirical conditional stock shares by wealth quartiles and the top 5 percent
of the distribution. The source for these data is Guiso et al. (2001) based on
the 1998 edition of the Survey of Consumer Finances; the definition of stocks in
14Strictly speaking the question reported in Lusardi and Mitchell refers to knowledge of
the historical record of the equity premium rather than long term forecasts so to make the
statement reported in the text one needs to add that expectations are formed based on past
observations. This assumption is consistent with the learning model used here. Moreover at
the empirical level it is reasonable that the long term forecast of the equity premium reflects
the long term historically recorded one. To support this just observe that the central tendency
for the 30-year forecast of finance professors reported in Welch (2000) is about 7 percent, very
close to historical records.
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Table 3: Conditional shares by wealth percentiles
Quartile I Quartile II Quartile III Quartile IV Top 5%
Data 40.7 45.0 49.0 60.4 64.0
Ambiguity 99.9 99.7 75.4 41.3 32.7
Learning 57.0 56.7 61.3 60.3 58.5
their data includes both directly and indirectly held equity. In the second and
third rows the corresponding figures from the model with ambiguity but not
learning and for the baseline model with learning in ambiguous environment
are reported. As we can see in the data the share of stocks conditional on
participation is increasing over the whole wealth distribution. On the other
hand the model without learning generates a very strongly negative relationship
between wealth and conditional stock shares. As we can see the share allocated
to the risky asset declines from virtually 100 percent to only 32.7 when moving
from the bottom quartile to the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution. When
learning is added to the model this declining pattern disappears and the share
of assets invested in risky equity remains more or less constant over the whole
distribution. Although this change is insufficient to match the data still it
represents an important step in the right direction.
To understand better where this result comes from in Table 4 we report the
patterns of conditional stock shares by wealth levels but conditioning on age.
This is done both for the model with ambiguity only and for the model with
learning in a multiple prior framework. To keep the table at a manageable size
the last two decades of life are not reported but their properties are similar to
those of the nearby decades of life. What we can see from the table is that in
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Table 4: Conditional shares by wealth percentiles and age
Quartile I Quartile II Quartile III Quartile IV Top 5%
Ambiguity
20-30 n.a n.a n.a 98.9 94.9
30-40 n.a 99.9 99.6 81.7 58.0
40-50 99.9 98.1 78.0 52.7 39.6
50-60 98.9 67.9 49.1 37.5 30.7
60-70 71.8 45.5 35.6 30.2 26.3
70-80 n.a 37.1 33.4 29.5 26.7
Learning
20-30 99.9 98.8 37.2 35.9 39.5
30-40 65.9 51.3 50.5 49.1 47.0
40-50 61.8 57.6 55.2 52.2 47.8
50-60 67.5 63.5 60.2 55.8 50.8
60-70 66.8 62.2 59.0 56.1 51.7
70-80 68.2 65.5 63.6 60.5 57.2
the model with ambiguity only, if we condition on age, the patterns of equity
shares by wealth are strongly monotonically decreasing: for example in the 40
to 50 age group the share declines from almost 100 percent to only about 40
percent and in the 60 to 70 age group it declines from about 72 percent to 26
percent.15
If we then look at the bottom panel where the portfolio allocation in the
model with learning is portrayed we see that while conditional on age the pattern
of stock shares by wealth is still declining, it is much less so than in the model
with ambiguity only. For example in the 40 to 50 year of age group, when moving
15The entries in the table marked with “n.a.”correspond to age-wealth cells where the
participation rate in the model is 0 so that a conditional equity share cannot be computed.
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Figure 9: Stock portfolio decision rules.
from the bottom quartile to the top 5 percent of the distribution, the decline in
the conditional stock share is only from 61.8 percent to 47.8 percent and in the 60
to 70 year group it is from 66.8 percent to 51.7 percent. The ability of the model
with learning to reduce the slope of the conditional share-wealth relationship
can be understood by looking at Figure 9. This figure is similar to Figure 7 but
it focuses on a household of a given age, more precisely, 50 years old and plots
the optimal portfolio allocation as a function of the past number of signals about
the stock return process observed prior to that age. As in the previous figure the
decision rules reported here are plotted assuming a past fraction of high signals
observed equal to 50 percent. As we can see these decision rules are declining
in wealth as in more conventional models and decision rules corresponding to
more observations are higher. This reflects the reduction in size of the set of
posterior distributions that the agent deems possible as more signals that reflect
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the underlying data generating process accrue. In a more conventional model
or in one with ambiguity only, for a given age the conditional stock share could
only decline with the amount of asset holdings, reflecting movements to the
right along a given curve. In a model with learning though a wealthier agent
can potentially invest a larger fraction of her wealth in stocks than a poorer
one. This is because a wealthier agent will have faced a better past history of
labor shocks, hence may have started to participate in the stock market earlier
and for this reason have observed more signals of the underlying return process.
This corresponds to movements towards higher decision rules. Although this
mechanism can potentially generate a positive relationship between wealth and
stock shares for market participants conditional on age, what we see from Table
4 is that, at least with the set of parameters used here, quantitatively the
model can take a step in the right direction by reducing the magnitude of the
negative slope of that relationship but not overturn its qualitative pattern. The
explanation for this can be found by observing that average wealth in model
units is about 9. Given the skewness of the wealth distribution most agents will
be close to the vertical axis, where the decision rules are very steeply sloping
downward. On the other hand for given wealth we can see in figure 9 that the
increase in the stock share with the number of signals is not huge: for example
the difference between an agent that has observed 24 signals and an agent that
has observed 30 signals is only about 10 percentage points. Clearly for the
mechanism proposed here to make the relationship between wealth and stock
shares conditional on age positive, large differences in the number of observed
signals between wealthy and poor agents are needed, but these are constrained
by the need to generate reasonable participation rates which forces the model
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to produce most entry in a narrow period of the life-cycle as it can be seen for
example from figure 8.
Summarizing, the fact that the model is able to generate a relationship
between conditional risky investment and wealth that is slightly increasing is in
part the result of a less negatively sloped relationship conditional on age and
in part the consequence of the reduction of conditional equity shares of young
households, who hold little wealth, compared to older and wealthier ones.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Summarizing the results of the two previous subsections we can say that a
reasonable amount of uncertainty about the stock return process and ambigu-
ity aversion enable an otherwise conventional life-cycle portfolio choice model
to predict moderate participation rates and moderate conditional stock shares
with low risk aversion and reasonably small participation costs. On the other
hand they generate conditional stock shares that are strongly decreasing in both
age and wealth moving a step in the wrong direction compared to a conventional
model. Adding learning in this multiple prior environment, while preserving the
ability of the model to generate moderate average participation rates and condi-
tional shares, also enables it to produce a life-cycle profile of stock allocation for
participants that is slightly increasing but with little variation as in the data. It
also makes conditional stock investment roughly constant in wealth thus taking
a step in the right direction towards matching the empirical evidence.
In choosing the parameters to calibrate the learning process I insured that
the resulting amount of ambiguity perceived by agents over their life-cycle was
reasonable. However in a dynamic context of learning it is not only the average
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extent of ambiguity that matters but also the way it unfolds over time. Since
there is no hard evidence based on which one can fix the parameters that deter-
mine this property the only thing that can be done is to perform a sensitivity
analysis. The present section is devoted to this task. As a side output this sec-
tion will also help further understanding the mechanisms at work in the model.
Beside the parameters related to learning the current section will perform a
sensitivity analysis also on the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Initial Ambiguity. In this first sensitivity analysis I change the size of the
set of distributions of the stock return that the household includes in its beliefs
at the beginning of life. I consider two cases: one with more ambiguity where
the initial set of priors for the probability of a high stock return is the interval
[0.276, 0.724] and one with less initial ambiguity where that set is the interval
[0.323, 0.677]. These imply an initial “worst case”equity premium of about -2
percent and -0.5 percent respectively. The remaining parameters are left un-
changed from the baseline case. The model with less initial ambiguity generates
an average participation rate of 50.5 percent and an average share for partic-
ipants of 64.6 percent. The model with higher initial ambiguity produces an
average participation rate of 36.7 percent and a conditional allocation to stocks
of 56.1 percent. As we can see the numbers are close to the data although the
participation rate in the case of more initial ambiguity is somewhat below. The
life-cycle profiles of conditional stock shares are reported in Figure 10. The fig-
ure also reports the same profile for the baseline case. As we can see the profile
in the case of less initial ambiguity lies above and is flatter than the baseline
case, while the life-cycle profile in the case of higher initial ambiguity lies below
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Figure 10: Life-cycle profile of conditional stock shares; changing initial ambi-
guity.
and is steeper. As a result they converge later in life.
To understand this result observe that less initial ambiguity means a smaller
set of beliefs at the beginning of life, hence the “worst case”expected equity
premium starts out larger. This means that the benefits of stock holding are
perceived to be larger. As a result more households will participate from the
very beginning and they will invest larger shares of their wealth in the stock
market. Also, since the evolution of the “worst case”equity premium tends
to follow an asymptotic path, the initial differences in participation rates and
conditional stock shares tend to vanish over the life-cycle. The life-cycle profiles
of participation rates are reported in figure 11. Qualitatively they are similar
to the ones in the baseline case, that is, they are increasing up to the 60 to
70 year old group and then flatten out or decrease mildly. Consistent with
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Figure 11: Life-cycle profile of stock market participation rates; changing initial
ambiguity.
the overall average participation rate, the profile is higher for the case when
initial ambiguity is smaller represented by the dashed line in the figure and
lower for the case when initial ambiguity is larger, represented by the dotted
line. The intuition is straightforward: higher initial ambiguity implies a smaller
“worst case”equity premium, hence smaller benefits from participation so that
households will start to participate later in life and do that to a lesser degree
all over the life-cycle.
“Speed”of Learning. In this paragraph the sensitivity analysis on the pa-
rameter α is performed. Two values are taken, that is, α = 0.1051 and α =
0.2991 and the remaining parameter that controls the properties of the evolu-
tion of the posterior set is changed so that the set itself at the beginning of
life is unchanged. The wording “speed”of learning refers to the fact that α
determines how strict is the statistical test based on which stock return distri-
butions are discarded or kept in the set of beliefs in the face of new signals:
46
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Age
Co
nd
itio
na
l s
to
ck
 s
ha
re
"Alpha"=0.1051
Baseline
"Alpha"=0.2991
Figure 12: Life-cycle profile of conditional stock shares; changing the “speed”of
learning.
a higher α implies a stricter test hence a quicker adaptation of beliefs to new
signals. In the case of α = 0.2991 the average participation rate is 46.9 percent
and the average equity share for participants is 68.6 percent, while in the case
of α = 0.1051 the average participation rate is 30.8 percent and stock holding
households invest on average 51.1 percent of their wealth in the risky asset. The
life-cycle profiles of conditional stock shares are reported in Figure 12, where
as usual, the continuous line reports the baseline case for comparison. Consis-
tently with the overall average, the line representing the conditional share for
the higher value of α lies above and the one for the lower value of α lies below
the one of the baseline case. Also the profile for α = 0.2991 shows an increase
from 50 percent to a little bit more than 60 percent between the first and the
second decade of life and then little variation thereafter, while the profile for
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Figure 13: Life-cycle profile of stock market participation rates; changing the
“speed”of learning.
α = 0.1051 follows a steeper pattern especially in the first four decades of life.
To understand this result observe that upon entry in the workforce in both
cases agents face the same amount of ambiguity. After that in the model with
larger α they update their beliefs more quickly which, on average, translates
into better “worst case”expected equity premia. This is reflected both in the
higher average participation rate and higher conditional stock share. Also since
with larger α the household gets rid of ambiguity more quickly, apart from the
first decade of life the life cycle profile of conditional stock shares shows a much
weaker slope. The life-cycle profile of participation rates is reported in figure
13. As it can be seen a higher “speed”of learning leads to a higher profile of
participation rates, given that the “worst case”equity premium will be higher.
As far as the shape of the profiles is concerned they are qualitatively similar to
the ones of the baseline case.
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Figure 14: Life-cycle profile of conditional stock shares, changing the informa-
tional advantage of participants.
Informational Advantage of Participants. In this section I consider a
further sensitivity analysis in which I change the probability that an agent that
does not participate in the stock market receives the signal about the stock
return process. In general, for a given “worst case”expected equity premium,
the higher that probability the smaller is the relative benefit of participation
compared to non participation. I consider two cases that move in opposite
directions starting from the baseline case. When the probability ξ that a non-
stockholding household receives a signal is set at the higher value of 0.3 the
average participation rate is 46 percent and the average conditional share is
62.6 percent, while when ξ is equal to 0.1 the average participation rate is
39.8 percent and the average conditional share is 56.8 percent. The life-cycle
profiles of conditional stock shares are reported in figure 14. As we can see the
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Figure 15: Life-cycle profile of stock market participation rates, changing the
informational advantage of participants.
two profiles are not very different from each other and from the baseline case.
The life-cycle profile for ξ = 0.1, that is, a lower probability of receiving a signal
is only a little steeper since it starts about 7 percentage points below the one for
ξ = 0.3 and then converges to it at the end of life. The intuition for these results
is the following: an increase in ξ implies that a larger proportion of agents that
do not find it optimal to participate in the stock market will receive the signal
about the return process anyway. On average this will imply that over time
their set of beliefs will shrink, hence the “worst case”expected equity premium
improves. This may induce them to participate in the market earlier than they
would have otherwise done. As a result the average percentage of participants in
the population increases. At the same time, as agents start participating earlier,
hence receive signals about the return process systematically from a younger
age, this will lead to earlier reduction of ambiguity and the observed increase
in the conditional share as well. The life-cycle profiles of participation rates are
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reported in figure 15. The upper dashed line represents the profile for the case
where non participants have a higher probability of receiving the signal while
the lower dotted line represents the case when they have a lower probability.
The profiles are increasing up to the age group 60 to 70 and then they flatten
out as in the baseline case. A higher probability of receiving the signal will tend
to improve the “worst case”equity premium for non participants which explains
why more agents will tend in the end to hold stocks, hence the higher life-cycle
profile. At the beginning of life the two profiles overlap and then diverge as
agents get older. This reflects the cumulative effect of a permanently higher
probability of receiving the signal for non stockholders in one case compared to
the other.
Risk Aversion. In this paragraph I explore the implications of changing risk
aversion in the current model and consider two alternative values, that is, 1.5
and 3.5. In the low risk aversion case the average participation rate is 40.9 per-
cent and the average conditional share is 74.3 percent; in the high risk aversion
case the average participation rate is 41.9 percent and the average conditional
share is 45.3 percent. The results concerning the conditional share are quite
standard since it is well known that an increase in the risk aversion coefficient
will cause the agent to reduce its exposition to the risky asset. As far as par-
ticipation rates are concerned, earlier work like Gomes and Michaelides (2005)
pointed out that an increase in risk aversion has two effects working in opposite
directions. On the one hand the reduction in the conditional share would make
agents less willing to pay the fixed participation cost thus reducing participa-
tion. On the other hand though, given the functional form chosen for the utility
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Figure 16: Life-Cycle profile of conditional stock shares; changing risk aversion.
function a higher risk aversion is associated with more prudence inducing higher
precautionary savings. This makes the agent more willing to pay the fixed cost,
hence increase participation. In their model the overall effect is to increase the
average participation rate while in
the current model with ambiguity and learning the two forces approximately
balance out leaving the average participation rate almost unaffected by the
coefficient of risk aversion, at least for the range of values considered. This
reflects the fact that the unitary benefit of investing in equity, which is driven by
the “worst case”equity premium is smaller hence the change of the overall benefit
is dampened. Results concerning the life-cycle profiles of conditional shares are
reported in Figure 16 where the middle continuous line again represents the
baseline case and is reported for comparison. Qualitatively the patterns do not
change with risk aversion: conditional shares are increasing and more than in
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Figure 17: Life-Cycle profile of stock market participation rates; changing risk
aversion.
the baseline case when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 1.5 while they
are virtually constant, except for the first decade of life when risk aversion is
increased to 3.5. The life-cycle profiles of stock market participation rates for
the three different values of the coefficient of relative risk aversion are reported
in figure 17. Consistent with the fact that the average participation rate in the
overall population is very similar in the three cases the three lines in the figure
are very close to each other and actually intersect. All the profiles are increasing
up to the 60 to 70 year of age group and then flatten out or decrease mildly.
Sensitivity Analysis of Conditional Shares by Wealth. In this para-
graph I summarize the results of the sensitivity analysis performed above but
with respect to the pattern of conditional stock holdings as a function of wealth.
In order to economize on space the tables with the conditional allocations to
stock by wealth and age groups are not reported. 16 The results of this anal-
16These tables are available from the author upon request.
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ysis are reported in Table 5. A look at the table confirms the result of the
baseline case that the patterns of conditional portfolio allocations by wealth do
not exhibit the strongly declining shape of the model with ambiguity only or
of a conventional model with sufficiently large risk aversion to generate reason-
able average shares. Within this general observation there are some differences
among the cases considered. For example some of the patterns are a little more
increasing although still less than in the data. One is the case of α = 0.2991
where the conditional allocation to stocks moves from 59.6 percent in the bot-
tom quartile of the wealth distribution to 71.3 percent in the third quartile to
stay roughly constant thereafter. If we go back to Figure 12 we see that this
case is also one where the life-cycle profile is flatter so that what we observe
across wealth levels is least driven by young poor agents holding lower condi-
tional shares. The main reason then is that conditional on age the relationship
between wealth and portfolio share of stocks is less declining than in the baseline
case. This can be explained by the fact that when α is higher learning occurs
faster, hence the benefits in term of a smaller sets of posteriors for those who get
the signals are larger. Wealthier agents in general start to participate earlier,
get more signals hence benefit more from the faster reduction in ambiguity. A
similar argument in the opposite direction explains why the case α = 0.1051
instead exhibits an overall declining pattern of conditional stock shares over the
wealth distribution. The other case that shows a more pronounced increase in
conditional stock shares over the wealth distribution is the one with ξ = 0.1
where the conditional share moves from 39.2 percent in the bottom quartile to
61.4 percent in the top one and then only modestly declines to 59.7 percent
in the top 5 percentiles of the distribution. The basic principle to interpret
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Table 5: Conditional shares by wealth percentiles
Quartile I Quartile II Quartile III Quartile IV Top 5%
Baseline 57.0 56.7 61.3 60.4 58.5
HIA 58.3 52.4 56.6 57.3 56.6
LIA 61.1 62.9 67.3 64.1 60.5
α = 0.1051 61.1 50.8 51.9 50.2 48.1
α = 0.2991 59.6 66.7 71.3 69.7 68.0
ξ = 0.1 39.2 49.0 59.6 61.4 59.7
ξ = 0.3 70.3 62.8 63.3 60.9 58.6
σ = 1.5 91.0 67.6 73.5 77.6 78.8
σ = 3.5 42.9 47.1 47.6 42.6 40.2
this result is the same as the one mentioned in the previous case: wealthier
agents through the observation of signals can reduce the size of the belief set,
hence increase the “worst case”equity premium better than poorer agents. Here
the reason is that given the lower probability of observing such signals for non
participants the difference between wealthier agent who participate more often
and poorer agents who participate less frequently becomes larger. Once again
moving the parameter in the other direction — ξ = 0.3 — leads to one of the
most declining patterns.
4.3 Other Issues
In this section three more sets of results will be presented that further help
understanding the model and its potential in explaining households’ financial
behavior. One concerns the effects that alternative histories of stock return
realizations have on “worst case”equity premia and households financial choices,
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the second the impact of different assumptions about ambiguity and learning
on the wealth distribution in the model. Finally the third is a brief analysis of
an alternative assumption about how signals are received and incorporated in
the belief set by participants and non participants.
4.3.1 Results of Sample Simulations
In order to study the main features of the model, in the previous sections this
was simulated for many different draws of the sequence of return shocks, and
results were obtained by averaging out the different simulations. In this section
we take two of those simulations and show the potential of the current setup
in explaining other features of households’ financial choices. For the purpose of
illustration two draws that display somewhat “extreme”patterns of stock return
realizations are chosen. The treatment given here is short, leaving for future
research the exploration of the full potential of the model along the directions
outlined here. Figures 18 and 20 report three variables: the bottom dashed
line represents the fraction of past stock returns that were high for the partic-
ular cohort in the simulation considered. The top dotted line represents the
“worst case”expected equity return that corresponds to that particular history
of shocks, while the continuous line represents the constant bond return and is
reported for comparison. The lines represent gross returns so that, for example,
the number 1.1 on the vertical axis when referring to returns means a 10 per-
cent net return. Figures 19 and 21 report the corresponding portfolio allocation
decisions, that is, the life-cycle participation rates and conditional stock shares
for that cohort. The simulations are performed using the parameters of the
baseline model. As it can be seen in Figure 18 that cohort experiences first an
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initial period of low returns, then from age 25 to 45 a long period of high stock
returns, followed by about 10 years of low returns. Finally these are followed by
high stock returns until death. These patterns in the realized sequence of stock
returns are mirrored in the sequence of expected “worst case”equity returns:
after starting out below the bond return this variable monotonically increases
up until age 45, then in response to the decade of low stock returns it declines
somewhat and finally it increases again starting from age 55. Figure 19 shows
that conditional stock shares, represented by the dashed line increase from 50
percent in the youngest age group to about 80 percent in the 40 to 50 year
of age group, then, in response to the decade of bad stock returns this share
declines to 70 percent in the 50 to 60 year of age group and finally increases
over the rest of the life-cycle. Participation rates increase monotonically over
the whole life-cycle due to the important effect of wealth accumulation during
working life, however, around age 50 the period of low stock returns flattens the
profile.17
A similar reasoning can be applied to figures 20 and 21. Looking at figure
20 we see that in this simulation an initial period of 5 years of high returns is
followed by a period of low returns up to age 30 or slightly more and a long
period of slightly less than average returns up to age 55. Later a period of
moderately high returns follows until death. In response to this pattern the
“worst case”expected equity return first climbs up but then starting at age 30
17Both life-cycle profiles are substantially higher than what is observed in the data. Looking
at figure 18 it is clear that this depends on the fact that the sequence of shocks represented in
this graph implies a substantially higher average stock return than the historical experience,
reaching about 10 percent in the last 40 years of life. This in turn has a strong effect in
generating very high “worst case”equity premia.
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Figure 18: Fraction of past high returns and “worst case”equity premium.
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Figure 19: Participation rate and conditional stock share.
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Figure 20: Fraction of past high returns and “worst case”equity premium.
it falls to values only slightly above the bond return; it is only after age 55 that
it systematically rises to generate a sizeable premium over the bond. Mirroring
these patterns, figure 21 shows that in the first decade of life, the average con-
ditional share in stocks is about 45 percent, after ten years of low stock returns
it goes down to 25 percent and then when the periods of“average”or above “av-
erage”returns sets in and the “worst case”equity premium starts increasing the
profile itself becomes strongly monotonically increasing. As for the participa-
tion profile it is monotonically increasing except between the third and fourth
decade of working life. Comparing figure 19 and 21 and interpreting them as the
simulation for two different cohorts facing a different history of stock returns,
we see how their choices may be quite different. For example the 30 to 40 year
of age group holds 25 percent of its portfolio in stocks in the second simulation
but 75 percent in the first one, reflecting the fact that in the latter there is an
initial string of high stock returns while the reverse occurs in the former.
These two sample simulations highlight two interesting points about the
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Figure 21: Participation rate and conditional stock share.
learning model. First even with an i.i.d. stock return process the model can
generate time-varying return expectations that depend on the experience of a
given cohort. Second, as a consequence, it introduces cohort effects in house-
hold financial decisions in the sense that choices can be different for the same
age group belonging to cohorts with different stock market experiences. While
it is not the purpose of this paper to further pursue this line of research it is
worth noticing that recent empirical work has confirmed that these effects can
be found in the data. In particular Malmendier and Nagel (2009), using the
Reuters/Michigan Survey of Consumers found that individuals of different ages
differ substantially in their inflation expectations with those differences being
related to their experienced inflation histories. These differences can reach sev-
eral percentage points in times with recent inflation experiences that are far
from the historical average. The fact that investors’ expectations about stock
market returns are higher after a period of high stock returns, consistent with
a story of learning from own experience, and that this is stronger for investors
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with shorter investment periods is documented in Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) who
also documents that actual stockholding choices do depend on these beliefs.
4.3.2 Wealth Distribution
In this subsection the implications for the wealth distribution of the models
presented in the paper are analyzed. This is done with the help of table 6
that reports the share of wealth of the bottom 40 percent and the top 20, 10
and 5 percent households in the data, in the no learning models, both with
and without ambiguity aversion and in the learning model with the baseline
choice of parameters. 18 The first thing that can be noticed is that the models
generate a wealth concentration that is largely inferior to the one in the data:
they overestimate the share of total wealth held by the bottom 40 percent of
the population and underestimate the one of the top 20, 10 and 5 percent.
This is no surprise since the current model features a simple earnings process
that itself generates little earnings inequality and it does not possess those
ingredients like intergenerational transmission of wealth and entrepreneurship
that have been recognized as important in order to generate sizeable estates at
the top of the distribution. When it comes to the comparison among models we
see that they generate roughly the same amount of wealth concentration. For
example, comparing the last two rows of the table we see that the model with
ambiguity but no learning generates a smaller share of wealth for the bottom
40 percentiles of the distribution but at the same time also a smaller share of
wealth for the top 10 and top 5 percentiles when compared with the baseline
model with learning. The differences though are in the order of one percentage
18The data are author’s calculations based on the 1998 issue of the Survey of Consumer
Finances.
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Table 6: The distribution of wealth
Wealth shares
Percentiles 0-40 80-100 90-100 95-100
Data 1.35 79.5 66.1 53.5
No ambiguity 4.2 64.5 42.7 26.7
Ambiguity 4.7 63.7 41.8 26.2
Learning 5.7 62.2 42.2 26.7
point or less. In principle the model with learning generates a more positively
sloped relation between wealth and the share of stocks suggesting that the higher
average return faced by richer agents should lead to higher wealth concentration,
however, as we saw in section 4.1.3 this is to a large extent the result of lower
shares of stocks in the portfolio of young households who are on average poorer
while conditional on age it is still true the stock shares are declining in wealth.
This is especially important for the issue of wealth concentration because the
top percentiles of the wealth distribution are made by agents around retirement
for whom this age-conditional negative relationship holds.
4.3.3 Alternative Signal Structure
In this subsection I describe the different results that the model produces under
an alternative signal structure. I will consider a case when agents learn in every
period but stock market participants learn faster in the sense that they have a
higher value of α than non participants. A full analysis of the model under this
assumption would require a lengthy discussion so what is done here is to present
just one case where parameters are chosen so that average participation rates
and conditional shares of stocks are in the ballpark of the empirical evidence
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Figure 22: Participation rate and conditional stock share.
and of the models considered in the previous sections. Results for the life-cycle
profiles are reported in figure 22 and those for the wealth-conditional share
relationship are reported in table 7. The model parameters are obtained by
taking the baseline calibration of section 4.1.2 and changing the values of α to
0.0552 for investors who decide to participate in the stock market and 0.02 for
those who decide not to do so. Notice that the value of α for participants is
below the one of the baseline calibration. This is needed because now agents are
learning in every period so that keeping the baseline value of α and assigning
a lower one to non participants would make the model over-predict both the
participation rate and the conditional stock share. Under the parameters chosen
here the average participation rate is 49.7 percent and the average share invested
in stocks by participants is 61.8 percent. Looking at figure 22 we see that the
life-cycle profile of participation rates is strongly increasing up to the 50 to 60
year old group and then is moderately so thereafter. The life-cycle profile of
conditional shares is increasing between the first two decades of life and then it is
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Table 7: Conditional shares by wealth percentiles
Quartile I Quartile II Quartile III Quartile IV Top 5%
Shares 81.5 70.1 64.9 62.7 63.5
virtually constant thereafter. These profiles are qualitatively very similar to the
ones of the previous sections where the informational advantage of participants
came through a higher probability of incorporating the stock return realization
into the belief set. As far as conditional shares of stocks by wealth levels are
concerned we can see from table 7 that they decline from 81.5 percent in the
bottom quartile of the wealth distribution to 64.9 percent in the third one and
then they remain constant for higher percentiles. Although slightly declining
this profile still represents an important improvement compared to the model
with ambiguity but not learning confirming the main qualitative results of the
model with learning.
Further signal structures can be imagined, for example one where agents in-
corporate the information about the stock return in their beliefs in every period
and in the same way whether they participate in the stock market or not. Un-
reported simulations though show that this assumption leads to counterfactual
results. To understand why observe that in the other cases considered so far,
stock market participation gives two expected benefits, one coming from the
“worst case”equity premium, the other from faster learning. If learning occurs
equally, independently of participation, this latter benefit vanishes and partici-
pation will occur only if the perceived benefit from the equity premium is larger
than the per-period participation cost. This benefit can be roughly thought of
as the product of the “worst case”equity premium times the amount invested
64
in stock. Young agents hold very little wealth which limits the amount they
can invest in stock, so a large “worst case”equity premium would be needed
to induce them to pay the fixed cost and participate. This leads the model
to counterfactual implications. First with a relatively high “worst case”equity
premium and a very high human-to-financial wealth ratio conditional shares
for the youngest age group will tend to be high creating an initial downward
stretch in the life-cycle profile. Second with an initially high “worst case”equity
premium and further learning the overall average of the portfolio stock share
for participants will be well above the empirical evidence. Adding ex-ante het-
erogeneity in the αs does not seem to help resolving the tension. This leads to
the conclusion that some advantage in the learning process for participants is
an important feature in explaining the empirical evidence. Once this advantage
is allowed the model is robust to the particular form chosen, as this subsection
shows.
5 Summary and Conclusions
In the present paper I have introduced ambiguity and learning in an ambigu-
ous environment in an otherwise basic model of life-cycle portfolio allocation.
It was shown that a plausible amount of ambiguity can rationalize moderate
conditional stock shares and moderate participation rates, as observed in the
data, by resorting to relatively small fixed costs of participating in the stock
market. Ambiguity alone though did not prove adequate to represent house-
hold behavior since it generated patterns of conditional stock shares that were
counter-factually declining in both age and wealth. When learning is introduced
the model, while still delivering moderate average participation rates and con-
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ditional stock shares for a wide range of parameters it also moves towards a
better fit with the data along two dimensions. First it generates life-cycle pro-
files of conditional stock shares that are mildly increasing in age. Second, for
some set of parameters it is also able to generate patterns of conditional stock
holdings over the wealth distribution that are mildly increasing. This second
result though is less robust to changes in key parameters. Also it is obtained in
part by the reduction in conditional shares for young agents that are on average
poorer, thus leaving the wealth-share relationship conditional on age still declin-
ing, albeit to a lesser degree than more conventional models or the model with
ambiguity but without learning. As such in this dimension the current theory
could be complemented by alternative models, like the non homothetic utility
model presented in Wachter and Yogo (2008) to match the empirical evidence
more closely.
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Appendix
A The Learning Model:A Formal Description
This appendix gives a minimal mathematical description of the learning model
informally outlined in section 2.4. The investor in the model perceives stock
returns as ambiguous. In particular he thinks that they are generated by the
same memoryless mechanism in each period and that even if there are features
of the data generating process that can be learned others are not.19 Mathemat-
ically learning is represented by a tuple (Θ,M0,L, α) where Θ is a parameter
space whose elements θ represent features of the data generating process that
the agents think are learnable. The set M0 is the set of priors on Θ and L is
a set of likelihood functions whose multiplicity reflects the existence of poorly
understood factors driving the returns. Finally α is a parameter that governs
the reevaluation process through which posteriors are constructed based on the
past observed returns. The set of posteriors is constructed based on a likelihood
ratio test and will be defined as:
Mαt (wt) = {µt(wt;µ0 ∈M0, `t ∈ Lt)|∫ t∏
j=1
`j(wj |θ)dµ0(θ) ≥ α max
µ˜0∈M0,˜`t∈Lt
∫ t∏
j=1
˜`
j(wj |θ)dµ˜0(θ)}. (17)
In this specific context Θ is assumed to be a one-dimensional set with elements
θ ∈ [λ¯, 1− λ¯] where λ¯ < 12 . The set of likelihoods is defined by `(1|θ) = θ+λ for
some λ ∈ [−λ¯, λ¯] and `(1|θ) is the probability of observing a high stock return
given the value of θ. The set of priorsM0 is given by all the Dirac measures on
19For a complete treatment of the subject the reader is referred to the original paper by
Epstein and Schneider (2005).
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Θ. Finally α is a constant that determines how the set of posteriors responds
to new information: were it equal to zero the set of posteriors Mt would be
equal toM0 for all t and no updating would occur. A higher value of α implies
a more stringent test so that a wider set of distributions is discarded from the
set of possible posteriors which then changes more quickly in response to new
observations. A value of λ¯ > 0 is needed for returns to be ambiguous signals.
It can be proved that under the simple specification used here the set of
posteriors depends on the sample only through the fraction of high stock returns
φt observed before t. More specifically it will obey the following law:
Mαt (wt) =
{
θ ∈ Θ : g(θ;φt) ≥ max
θ˜∈Θ
g(θ˜;φt) +
log(α)
t
}
(18)
where g(θ;φt) = φt log(θ+ λ¯)+ (1−φt) log(1− θ+ λ¯). This specification is very
convenient for the current problem since it only adds two state variables to the
agent’s optimal dynamic program — the number of signals observed and the
fraction of those that were high stock returns — allowing it to retain numerical
tractability.
B Numerical Solution Method
In this section I will briefly describe the numerical methods used to solve the
model presented in the paper. The procedure requires two steps, that is, first
solving the agent’s dynamic programming problem and second simulating the
model by using the decision rules obtained in the first step and draws of the
realizations of the stock return and the individual histories of earnings and
mortality shocks. Because of the minimization with respect to the set of beliefs
the dynamic programming problem turns out to be more demanding than in
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a standard problem. In practice one has to compute the set of posteriors Mt
and then choose the pairs θ ∈ Mt and λ ∈ [−λ¯, λ¯] that minimize maxima with
respect to the distributions in the set of admissible beliefs. The computation of
such set then requires the addition of two state variables that were labeled φt and
nt in the text and that represent the total number of stock return realizations
observed as signals of the underlying process and the fraction of those that were
high. The assumption that short selling the stock was exogenously ruled out
though, allows the model to retain tractability since under that assumption the
minimizing distribution will be the one that minimizes the probability of a high
stock return. The state space is discretized along the asset dimension using a
grid of 165 points that is finer close to the origin and coarser away from it.
The process for the labor earnings shock is also discretized by using 7 points
and approximated with the method in Tauchen (1986). As far as φt and nt are
concerned observe that in principle those are discrete variables. However the
number of values they can take over a 80 year period — one like the lifespan —
is very high. For this reason the value function was computed only on a subset
of 11 points in each of those dimensions and interpolation was used elsewhere.
Functions were approximated via cubic splines along all the dimensions that
required interpolation. The maximization with respect to stocks and bonds
was performed using Brent’s method: the method consists of bracketing the
maximum with a triple, fitting a parabola through it and use it to eliminate the
lowest point in the initial triple, then iterating until no further increase in the
value of the function to optimize can be obtained. 20 The method is repeated
20See Brent (1973) for the theory and description of the method and Press et al. (1992) for
the actual algorithm.
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along each dimension — that is, each of the two assets — in turn by exploiting
the relation maxx,y f(x, y) = maxx{maxyf(x, y)}.
Once the decision rules are obtained the model is simulated. Multi-linear
interpolation of the decision rules is used whenever the participation decision
is the same at the 8 grid points defining a cube in the state space. Otherwise
the optimal decision is recalculated using the value functions obtained in the
previous step. This procedure is more accurate than simply applying multi-
linear interpolation in all cases, however it is also more time consuming. Also
the computation of statistics by wealth levels is also somewhat time consuming.
For this reason the simulation is done by considering a cohort of 1000 agents
and repeating it 30 times. Results are obtained by averaging over the 30 rep-
etitions. To insure robustness for some set of parameters the simulations were
also repeated by doubling both the number of households and the number of
repetitions. Results were always very similar to the ones obtained with fewer
agents.
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